Abstract. Enterprise middleware systems typically consist of a large cluster of machines with stringent performance requirements. Hence, when a performance problem occurs in such environments, it is critical that the health monitoring software identifies the root cause of the problem with minimal delay. A technique commonly used for isolating performance problem root causes is rule definition, which involves specifying combinations or patterns of events that cause particular problems. An effective method for specifying rules or problem signatures in these systems is to define them as boolean combinations of change points in key performance metrics. However, such predefined rules tend to be inflexible, and crucially depend on domain experts for their definition. We present in this paper a method that automatically generates change point based problem signatures using administrator feedback, thereby removing the dependence on domain experts for creating correct problem signatures. The problem signatures generated by our method are flexible, in that they do not require exact matches for triggering, and adapt as more information becomes available. Unlike traditional data mining techniques, where one requires a large number of events to extract meaningful patterns, the method presented in this paper requires few fault incidents to correctly learn the problem signature for a fault. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by learning problem signatures for five common problems that occur in enterprise systems and reliably recognizing these problems with a small number of learning instances.
Introduction
Modern enterprise systems are often required to provide services based on service level agreement (SLA) specifications at minimum cost. SLA breaches typically result in a significant penalty. Performance problems in these multi-tier enterprise systems usually manifest themselves as high response times, low throughput, or a high rejection rate of incoming requests. However, the root cause of these problems may lie in one of hundreds or thousands of software and hardware components present in different stacks at each tier. These problems can be due to subtle reasons hidden in the complex stack of this execution environment. For example, we may see application layer problems such as badly written application code causing an application to hang suddenly. Network layer problems like non availability of a connection between an application server and a database server can cause critical transactions to fail. Backup processes that start on a machine could cause performance degradation of servers running on the machine. Further, the various components in such a system could have multiple inter-dependencies which may be temporal or non-deterministic in nature as they may change with changes in topology, application or SLA requirements. This further complicates root cause localization. It is crucial that enterprise systems contain health management systems that can quickly and accurately pinpoint the root cause of these performance problems.
A commonly used even correlation technique for localizing the root cause of performance problems is rule definition [6] . In rule definition, all possible root causes are represented by rules specified as condition-action pairs. Conditions are typically specified as logical combinations of events, and are defined by experts for a specific domain. A rule is said to be satisfied, when a combination of events raised by the management system exactly matches the condition corresponding to the rule. Rule based problem determination systems while popular, suffer from two major drawbacks. First, they depend on domain experts to specify the rules. Second, rules are inflexible -they require exact matches and do not adapt as the environment changes.
An effective way of defining rules is to specify the rule condition (or problem signature) as a boolean combination of changes in performance metric time series values [4] . The advantage of specifying signatures in such a manner is that the events in the conditions are not based on error-prone predefined static thresholds. The use of change point detection techniques also ensures that whenever there is a performance problem or an abnormal condition, some events are usually generated. While this method does alleviate problems associated with static threshold based rule definition and ensures a sequence of events during performance problems, it still suffers from the drawbacks of rule based systems, viz., inflexibility and dependence on experts for definition.
Automatic learning of rules has been studied earlier by Hellerstein et al. [1] [3]. They discover patterns using association rule mining [17] based techniques. They observe that when a fault occurs in a system, it is usually accompanied by a burst of events that have a higher density than during normal operation. Additionally, each fault is usually associated with a specific pattern of events.
To corroborate the above findings, we performed a number of experiments with a multi-tier application running in a cluster, using change point based monitoring of key performance metrics. These experiments consisted of several repetitions of different faults and resulted in the following observations:
• There are a few change point alarms that occur repeatedly. These alarms may represent innocuous events that occur during normal operation of a system, and will probably not help in determining the root cause of a fault.
• Certain alarms always occur when a fault occurs, resulting in a pattern that is very indicative of the underlying fault. This core set of alarms is repeated for every occurrence of a particular fault under different operating conditions. In this paper we present a method that exploits the two properties mentioned above to associate patterns of change point based alarms with a given fault, and automatically generate a problem signature for that fault. Unlike several earlier approaches [1] [3] for rule learning, we can learn the problem signature for a fault with a very small number of fault instances. This is a significant improvement over traditional data mining based techniques where one needs a number of training instances in order to find patterns in a large number of events. The method presented in this paper also adaptively updates the problem signatures as new information is made available to it. Additionally, our method does not assume any prior domainexpert knowledge, and it learns effective problem signatures based only on feedback from the system administrator. It also doesn't make any assumptions about the presence of a symptom-fault map like some earlier approaches [5] . Further, the problem signatures learned and used by our method are flexible and do not require exact matches to locate a root cause. Even when all symptoms corresponding to a root cause do not appear, our method can predict the root cause with high probability.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our algorithm for learning problem signature patterns. Section 3 describes a system design for the learning method. Section 4 presents experimental results for our algorithm in the presence of six faults in a clustered enterprise system. In Section 5, we discuss related work. Section 6 discusses future directions for this work and presents our conclusions.
Learning Methodology
In this section we describe our method for learning patterns (or problem signatures 1 ) corresponding to the various faults that occur in an enterprise environment. We assume here that no two faults occur simultaneously. The learning method operates on the basic assumption that whenever a fault occurs in a system, it is usually associated with a specific pattern of events. In our experimental evaluation and system architecture, these events correspond to abrupt changes in various performance metrics that we monitor.
The input to our learning method comprises of: a. a sequence of time-stamped events (that occur during normal operation and during faults) representing change point based alarms that arise from each application server in a clustered system b. the times of occurrence of the various faults at a given application server c. input from a system administrator who correctly labels a fault when it occurs for the first time, or when the method fails to detect it altogether d. feedback from a system administrator to verify the correctness of the output generated by our method The mechanism to provide the first two inputs required by our learning method is described in Section 3. We first define two scores computed by our learner -a relevance score and a co-occurrence score, and then describe our learning and matching algorithm.
Co-occurrence Score
Our learning method computes a co-occurrence score, or c-score, for every alarm that is ever raised in the vicinity of a fault. We define vicinity as a fixed time window around the occurrence of a fault.
For a particular fault F that the learner encounters, the c-score measures the probability of an alarm A being triggered when F occurs. The c-score is computed as follows
is the number of times alarm A is triggered when fault F occurs, and F # is the total number of occurrences of fault F observed so far. The c-score value for an alarm-fault pair ranges from 0-1. If the c-score for an alarm-fault pair A-F is high, it indicates that there is a high probability that the alarm A will occur when fault F occurs.
Relevance score
Our learning method computes a relevance score, or r-score, for every single alarm that it ever encounters. The r-score for an alarm is a measure of the importance of the alarm as a fault indicator. An alarm has high relevance if it usually occurs only when a fault occurs, and it has a low relevance if it usually occurs during normal system operation. The learning method computes the relevance score for an alarm A as follows
is the number of times A is raised when any fault occurs in the system, and A # is the total number of times A has been raised so far. The rscore value for an alarm ranges from 0-1. Note that the r-score is a global parameter for an alarm i.e. there is just one r-score for an alarm unlike the c-score which is per alarm-fault pair. An underlying assumption here is that the monitored enterprise system runs in normal mode more often than it does in faulty mode. When this is true, alarms that are raised regularly during normal operation will be assigned a low relevance score, while alarms that are raised only when a fault occurs will be assigned a high relevance score.
Matching Algorithm
We present here the algorithm that we use to learn and match fault patterns. Our method uses a pattern repository to store patterns that it learns. It starts with an empty repository and adds fault patterns to the repository based on feedback it receives from the system administrator. Recall that the inputs to our method include an indication of when a problem occurs at a server and a corresponding alarm pattern.
If a fault occurs when the pattern repository is empty, our method just notifies the administrator that a fault has occurred and depends on the administrator for finding the root cause of the fault. After locating the root cause, the administrator provides a new label for the fault 2 . Our method then records the pattern of alarms observed in the vicinity of the fault, along with the fault label, as a new problem signature. Each alarm in this new signature is assigned a c-score of 1.
For every subsequent fault occurrence, our method uses the following procedure in order to attempt a match with the fault patterns that exist in the repository. To compute the degree of match for a fault 
To compute the mismatch penalty for a fault By definition, the r-value for very relevant alarms is high, and the r-value for irrelevant alarms is low. Hence, if there are mostly irrelevant alarms in the difference set MF S , the ratio in the second term would be very low and F M would have a high value.
Using F D and F M we compute a final ranking weight F W for a fault F as,
Once our method computes ranking weights for all faults currently in the repository, it presents to the administrator a sorted list of faults whose ranking weight is above a threshold w t . If no fault in the repository has a ranking weight above this threshold, it reports that there is no match.
The administrator uses this list to locate the fault causing the current performance problem. If the actual fault is found on the list, the administrator accepts the fault. This feedback is used by the learning method to update the c-scores for all alarms in C S for that particular fault. In the event that the list does not contain the actual fault, the administrator rejects the list and assigns a new label to the fault. The learner then creates a new entry in the pattern repository, containing the alarms in c S , each with a c-score of 1.
Matching Algorithm Example
We present here an example that explains the functioning of our method. Assume that These faults have the following problem signatures associated with them, stored as a set of alarm and c-score pairs.
Suppose we now observe a fault with a set of alarms
Assume that the r-scores of these alarms have been calculated as
The intersection of the alarms in c S with the alarm sets corresponding to 
System Design for the Learning Method
We describe here our system design, and the method we use for providing inputs to the learning method described in Section 2. The first input required by our learning method is a sequence of time-stamped alarms for every server in the multi-tier clustered system. To provide this input, we monitor and sample runtime performance metrics at each server and use change point detection techniques such as difference of means [4] to generate time-stamped alarms. The actual component implementing the learning method is implemented for each server in the clustered system. The pattern repository is a common repository that is shared amongst all the learning components. The actual trigger for the learning method comes from an SLA breach predictor that operates at each server. The SLA breach predictor triggers off the learning method as soon as it detects an abrupt change in response time or throughput in the absence of any significant change in the input load on a given server. Once the learning component gets a trigger from the SLA breach predictor, it fetches all the alarms in the vicinity of the current trigger. As discussed in Section 2, the vicinity is defined using a fixed time window around the occurrence of the fault. The fetched alarms are then fed to the learning method and it operates on them as described in Section 2. The final outcome from the learning method is a sorted list of faults with the most likely fault at the top.
In a clustered system, this list of faults is then sent to a central controller. The central controller upon receiving a list, can take one of the following actions: a. If only one of the servers reports a list of faults during a given time interval, then it is assumed that a fault affecting only of the servers has occurred and the list of faults from the affected server is displayed to the system administrator. b. If all the running servers report a list of faults during a given time interval and the most likely fault (the one that is at the top of the list) is the same for all servers, it is assumed that the fault is at a backend system that is being shared by all the servers. This is typically the case with performance problems at a database that is shared by all servers. The central coordinator chooses the top most fault and displays that fault to the system administrator. This approach helps in reducing the list of faults displayed to the administrator as modern clustered systems can consist of hundreds of servers. c. If only a subset of running servers report a list of faults during a given time interval, two cases need to be considered: i) It is possible that the faults occurring on all the servers reporting a list are independent of each other, and they all need to be displayed to the administrator. ii) In modern clustered systems, a fault occurring on one server can affect the runtime metrics of other servers due to an "interference effect". In our current design, the controller treats the above two cases in the same manner and displays the lists for each server to the system administrator. We are currently working on enhancing our learning method to take care of case ii) mentioned above.
Evaluation
We describe in this section, our experimental test-bed, three-tier application and workload generator, system implementation, and our experimental results.
Test-bed
Our test-bed consists of eight machines: one machine hosting two load generators, two request router machines, three back end application server machines and a relational database server machine. The back end servers form a cluster, and the workload arriving at the routers is distributed to these servers based on the routing weight assigned to each server. The machine running the back end servers have identical configuration. They have a single 2.66 GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU and 1 GB of main memory. The machine running the workload generators is identical except that it has 2 GB of main memory. Each of the routers have one 1.7 GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 1 GB of main memory. The database machine is the most powerful with one 2.8 GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 2 GB of main memory. All machines run RedHat Linux Enterprise Edition 3, kernel version 2.4.21-27.0.1.EL. The router and back end servers run the IBM WebSphere software middleware platform, and the database server runs DB2 version 8.1.
Application and Workload
For our experiments, we ran Trade 6 [22] on each of the back end nodes. Trade 6 is an end-to-end benchmark that models a brokerage application. It provides an application mix of servlets, JavaServer Pages, transactional enterprise beans, message-driven beans, Java database connectivity (JDBC), and Java Message Service (JMS) data access. It supports operations provided by a typical stock brokerage including account creation, browsing stock quotes, buying and selling stocks.
We used IBM Websphere Workload Simulator [23] to drive our experiments. The workload consists of multiple clients concurrently performing a series of operations on their accounts over multiple sessions. Each of the clients has a think time of 1 second. The actions performed by each client and the corresponding probabilities of their invocation are: register new user (2%), view account home page (20%), view account details (10%), update account (4%), view portfolio (12%), browse stock quotes (40%), stock buy (4%), stock sell (4%), and logoff (4%). These values correspond to the typical usage pattern of a trading application.
The simulator sends all requests to the request router. The router does not differentiate between request types, and it routes requests based on current routing weights of the cluster members. Every client session starts with a client login and terminates when a client logs off. On logging in, the application returns a cookie that is used by the client for all subsequent requests during the session. This ensures that the same server services all requests within a single client session. When a client logs off, the simulator discards the cookie, and obtains a new session cookie for a subsequent login.
Experimental Runs
In order to perform a detailed evaluation of our learning method over a number of parameters and fault instances, we generate traces containing the inputs required by our learning method and perform an offline analysis. The only difference from an online version is that the administrator feedback is provided as part of the experimentation.
We implement the breach predictor as a component that resides within one of the routers in out test-bed. It subscribes to router statistics and logs response time information per server at a 5 second interval. Each server in the cluster also monitors and logs performance metric information. We currently record JDBC, thread pool and system level performance metrics for each server. We run a total of 60 experiments, each of duration one hour. The first 45 minutes of each experiment consist of normal system operation after which we insert a fault into the system. The five faults that we randomly insert in our system are:
• a CPU hogging process at a node hosting one of the application servers • an application server hang created by modifying our application such that all requests to the server sleep after the server receives a poison request • a network failure between an application server and the database (simulated using the Linux iptables command) • a database shutdown • a database performance problem (created either by a CPU hog on the database machine or an index drop in the database schema). We maintain a constant client load during each individual experiment, and vary the load between 30 and 400 clients across experiments. After obtaining the traces corresponding to these 60 experiments, the learning and matching phase involves feeding these traces to our method sequentially. This phase presents a specific sequence of alarms to the learning method. In order to avoid any bias towards a particular sequence of alarms, we repeat the learning and matching phase a 100 times, providing a different random ordering of the traces each time.
For all our experiments, we use a c-score threshold of 0.5. This implies that an alarm in a problem signature for a fault F is used in the degree-of-match computation only is it occurs in at least 50% of the instances of F. False Positives and Negatives
False Positives and Negatives
We first explore the performance of our learning method in terms of the number of false positives and negatives generated. We compute the false negative count as the number of times our method does not recognize a fault (i.e. the number of times a fault does not show up in the list generated by our method). However, when our method sees a fault for the first time, it does not count as a false negative. After completing all 100 phases, we compute the average number of false negatives generated by our method. False positives occur when a new fault introduced in the system is recognized by our method as an existing fault in the repository. In order to estimate the number of false positives we use the following methodology. We randomly choose a fault F and remove all traces containing F from the learning phase of our method. We then feed traces containing F to our method and calculate the number of times it is recognized as an already observed fault. We repeat this procedure for each fault and compute the average number of false positives. Figure 1 shows the average percent of false positives and false negatives generated by our method as we vary the ranking weight threshold between 10 and 100. Recall that the ranking weight is our estimate of the confidence that a new fault pattern matches with a pattern in our repository. Only pattern matches resulting in a ranking weight above the threshold are displayed to the administrator.
As one would expect, when the threshold is low (20% or lower) we generate a large number of false positives. This is because at low thresholds even irrelevant faults are likely to generate a match. As we increase the threshold beyond 20%, the number of false positives drop steadily, and they are close to zero at high thresholds (80% or higher). Note that false positives are generated only when a new fault occurs in the system. Since new faults can be considered to have relatively low occurrence over a long run of a system, a false positive percent of 20-30% may also be acceptable after an initial learning period. Our method generates few false negatives for thresholds under 50%. For thresholds in the 50-70% range, false negatives range from 3-21%. Thresholds over 70% generate a high percent of false negatives.
As is the case with any learning method, there is a trade off between the number of false positives and negatives generated by our method. The curves for the two measures intersect when the ranking weight threshold is approximately 65%, and the percent of false positives and negatives is each about 13%. When the false negatives are at 8% false positives are approximately 16%, and at a 3% false negative rate false positives are approximately 30%.
As we can see in Figure 1 , a good region of operation for our method is between a weight threshold of 50-65%, with more false positives at the lower end of the region, and more false negatives at the higher end. An approach that we can use to obtain good overall performance is to start our method using a threshold close to 65%. During this initial phase, it is likely that a fault occurring in the system will be new, and this high threshold will help in generating few false positives. As our method learns patterns for these faults, and the number of new faults becomes relatively rare, the threshold can be lowered below 50% in order lower the number of false negatives. We demonstrate later in this section that our method learns fault patterns quickly, and because of this property we would typically need to maintain a high threshold for only a short period of time.
Precision
While false negatives are a good measure of how well our method is performing, it is equally important to evaluate how well the method ranks potential faults in the repository. If a fault is always detected but usually ends up at the bottom of the list of potential root causes, the analysis is likely to be of little use. In order to measure how effectively our method matches new instances of known faults, we define a precision measure. Each time our method detects a fault, we assign a precision score depending on the position at which the actual fault occurs in the output list. The formula we use to compute the precision score for a particular match is 
Precision of learner
A false negative is assigned a precision score of 0, and our method is not penalized for new faults that are not present in the repository. We perform 100 iterations over the traces using the random orderings described above, and compute the average precision of our method. Figure 2 shows average precision values for ranking weight thresholds ranging from 10-100. We can see that our precision score is high for thresholds ranging from 10-60%. For thresholds ranging from 10-30%, the average precision is 98.7%. At a threshold of 50% the precision is 97%, and at a threshold of 70% the precision is 79%. These numbers correspond well with the false negative numbers presented in the previous section, and they indicate that when the method detects a fault, it usually places the correct fault at the top of the list of potential faults.
Rate of Learning
We demonstrate in this section a key property of our learning method -it can learn a relevant pattern for a fault given very few instances of the fault. In order to evaluate the rate at which our method learns patterns, we perform the following experiments. We first set a learning threshold which is the maximum number of instances of a fault that our method can use in order to learn. Any fault instances over the learning threshold are only used to evaluate the precision of our method, and cannot be used by the learner to update its scores. We then run our method over each fault using several values of the learning threshold, and obtain an average precision score for each threshold value. Figure 3 shows precision scores for three values of the learning threshold, 1, 2, and 4. The precision values are shown for ranking weight thresholds ranging from 10-100. We can see that even when our method is provided with only a single instance of a fault, it has precision values of about 90% when the ranking weight is 50%. This is only about 8% worse than the best possible precision score. At a higher ranking weight threshold of 70%, the precision is about 14% lower than the best possible precision.
With two learning instances, the precision score is 96% at a 50% ranking weight threshold, and 77% at a 70% ranking weight threshold, only 2% worse than the best possible precision at both thresholds. With four learning instances, the score is only 1% below the best possible precision score at both ranking weight thresholds, and any learning instances beyond that increase the precision by a very small percentage. This data clearly shows that our method learns patterns rapidly, with as few as two instances of each fault required to obtain a very high level of precision. This is largely due to two reasons. First, we use change point detection techniques to generate events during normal operation as well as when faults occur and we have found that they reliably generating unique patterns for different faults. Second, the two scores used by our method -the c-score and the r-score (described in Section 2) help us to filter out spurious events that occur during normal as well as faulty operation of a system.
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Related Work
A lot of work has been done in fault localization and problem determination. The most common approaches to fault localization include AI techniques [5] [19] and fault propagation techniques [12] such as Bayesian networks, and causality graphs.
As discussed in Section 1, automatic learning of rules has been studied earlier by Hellerstein et al. [1] [3] . They discover patterns using association rule mining based techniques [17] . They observe that when a fault occurs in a system, it is usually accompanied by a burst of events that have a higher density than during normal operation. Additionally, each fault is usually associated with a specific pattern of events. Association rule based techniques require a large amount of sample instances before discovering "k-itemset" [21] in a large number of events. The method presented in this paper overcomes this limitation and is able to discover patterns with a very small number of fault instances as discussed in Section 4. Another drawback of the technique presented in [1] [3] is their reliance on periodicity of patterns. The system presented in this paper doesn't make any assumptions about periodic occurrence of events.
Another closely related work is presented in [12] , where the authors describe an event driven fault diagnosis technique that employs incremental learning. The authors propose techniques to rank a fault according to a "goodness" measure that allows multiple simultaneous faults to be identified. Fault diagnosis is incrementally improved as more and more symptoms become available. Although this technique is promising, it makes an assumption about the presence of a symptom-fault map as an input. Such a probabilistic map between faults and symptoms may not be available in an enterprise environment. Our method makes no such assumption.
A lot of earlier approaches have used dependency analysis for fault localization. In [7] [14] [18] , the authors assume that the mechanism to generate events is already in place and the root cause analysis algorithm analyzes these events in a systematic way using certain properties of the executing environment such as a dependency tree. Alarms relying on static dependencies between system components may be analyzed for problem determination [9] . Katker [15] also shows how the dependency graph may be used to perform systematic analysis of a problem and identify the root cause in the network fault management domain. In both these approaches, the authors assume the presence of a dependency tree. These approaches may not work in dynamic and heterogeneous modern enterprise systems where dependencies are ephemeral and change with topology and applications.
Other related work [13] [18] [19] [8] has focused on studying the behavior of the various components and structural changes in the system and looking for anomalies in them. These approaches usually isolate the problem to one component of the system. Thus, they fall short of localizing the actual root cause of the problem and can only detect bottlenecks in the path of transactions. In [13] , the incoming requests are traced and the list of the components used by several succeeded or failed requests are clustered to statistically identify the set of failed components. In [8] , an optimized set of synthetic transactions is used to probe the system for possible problems. This technique puts additional load on the system which may not be acceptable to customers in a production environment. Furthermore, constructing an optimized set of probes is an N-P hard problem. In both these approaches [13] [8] , once the problem is isolated to one component of the multi-tier system, further diagnosis of the problem to localize the root cause is left to the system administrator and his domain knowledge expertise.
In [10] [11], a combination of probing (in the form of fault injection) and dependency analysis is used for fault localization. Dynamic dependency information is generated by Active Dependency Discovery (ADD) [10] . ADD builds the system dependency graph by individually perturbing the system components during a testing phase, while fault injection is used at run-time. This technique suffers from similar disadvantages as [8] .
Rule based systems such as [6] are used to define rules, and events are generated based on satisfaction of these rules. In classical rule based systems, rules are specified manually and they are static in nature i.e. they do not evolve automatically and all new additions and updates to the rule are done manually. The system presented in this paper discovers the rules using administrator feedback and these rules are updated regularly with changes in topology and/or applications. Even when incomplete or partial information is available, the method presented in this paper uses the available data to return a rule that matches the closest. It also updates its own confidence level in the rule during this process. Traditional rule based systems, on the other hand look for exact matches and fail to evolve.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel technique for discovering change point based adaptive patterns for problem resolution in enterprise systems. We demonstrated the efficacy of our technique by learning the problem signatures for 5 common faults that occur in enterprise systems and reliably recognizing these problems with high precision. One of the main contributions of this paper is that we discover these patterns quickly, with very few instances of a fault. This is a significant improvement over traditional data mining techniques which require a large number of fault instances to discover patterns. The patterns generated by our method are flexible, in that they do not require exact matches for triggering. Another significant contribution of our work is that our technique is able to discover adaptive patterns i.e. if the pattern for a particular fault changes over time due to reasons such as changes in topology, workload, application version, etc, our method automatically updates the pattern repository with the new pattern over time.
There are a few future directions to the work presented in this paper. One of the issues that we intend to tackle is the absence of certain alarms during the problematic phase. The absence of a particular alarm during the problematic phase may be as indicative of a fault as the presence of other alarms. Our method currently doesn't handle rare cases where significantly different patterns are generated for a single fault alternately. An extension to our method would associate more than one pattern to a single fault if there exists a significant mismatch between the patterns. Another improvement to our technique is the use of negative feedback from the administrator for any fault that is incorrectly present or wrongly missing from the output list. An extension to our current method could include events generated by sources other than the currently monitored performance metrics, such as event logs.
